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FOR THE “DEALS” NO SHOPPER COULD 
PASS UP: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S 
INTERPRETATION OF CALIFORNIA’S 
FALSE ADVERTISING LAW IN 
HINOJOS V. KOHL’S CORPORATION 
Leslie E. Schuster 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, California voters approved an initiative to eliminate 
private consumer standing under California’s False Advertising laws 
(FAL) and Unfair Competition laws (UCL) in most cases.1 A broad 
coalition of business interests supported the campaign for this 
initiative, also known as Proposition 64 (“Prop. 64”).2 The pro–Prop. 
64 campaign claimed that California’s legal system had run amok 
because the consumer standing requirements encouraged “frivolous 
lawsuits,” of which businesses were the victims.3 However, there 
was little factual basis for this assertion, and the campaign glossed 
over the countless meritorious lawsuits that consumers pursued in 
order to address the financial and emotional injuries caused by 
 
  J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Political Science, 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, April 2010. I would like to thank Professor Jennifer 
Rothman for her guidance on this Comment and for always challenging me to do my best. Thank 
you to the talented and dedicated staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. Finally, thank 
you to my family for their unending support and encouragement.  
 1. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 2013); id. § 17200. The 2004 amendment to 
section 17204 (which lays out the standing requirements to pursue claims under these statutes) 
did not eliminate consumer standing entirely, but significantly narrowed the meaning of 
“economic loss or injury,” as required to obtain standing. See infra Part IV. Under these 
amendments, consumers could still sue as members of a class action or if a public official 
initiated litigation on their behalf. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204.  
 2. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS, PROP. 64 (2004), available at 
http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2004/general/propositions/prop64text.pdf; Yes on 64 
Californians to Stop Shakedown Lawsuits, FOLLOW THE MONEY, http://www.followthemoney 
.org/database/StateGlance/committee.phtml?c=1219 (last visited Apr. 12, 2014) (featuring a table 
of the proponents’ top twenty contributors). 
 3. See infra Part IV. 
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deceptive business practices.4 
In the ten years since Prop. 64’s passage, consumer protection 
advocates have repeatedly expressed concern that the amended FAL 
and UCL “significantly limit[] the ability of private individuals and 
public interest groups to bring . . . consumer protection lawsuits 
against suspected corporate wrongdoers.”5 As a matter of statutory 
interpretation, the extent to which Prop. 64 limited or removed 
private consumer standing was unclear.6 However, in Hinojos v. 
Kohl’s Corp.,7 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals quelled consumer 
protection advocates’ fears with its interpretation of the Prop. 64 
amendments.8 Hinojos involved a department store that allegedly 
inflated “original” prices during “sales” to give the impression of a 
bargain based on purported reductions.9 The Ninth Circuit held that 
when a consumer alleges that he would not have made a purchase but 
for the retailer’s misrepresentation of price, that consumer has 
suffered an economic injury sufficient to meet the standing 
requirement and state a claim under the FAL and UCL.10 This 
holding broadened the requisite injury for consumer suits to a 
 
 4. See Gregory Klass, The Meaning, Purpose, and Cause in the Law of Deception, 100 
GEO. L.J. 449, 450, 463 (2012) (discussing the presumption of emotional injury caused by 
deception); see also Marc Lifsher, Lockyer Joins Prop. 64 Fray, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2004, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/oct/01/business/fi-prop641 (discussing Prop. 64 supporters’ fears 
that individuals were previously suing small businesses without having been directly harmed); 
Fact Sheet: “Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse” Groups, CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, 
http://centerjd.org/content/fact-sheet-citizens-against-lawsuit-abuse-groups (last visited Oct. 20, 
2013) (“The CALA message is a sly deception designed to appeal broadly to patriotic, hard-
working Americans, many of whom will ultimately serve on juries. At its core, the message 
equates the efforts of injured consumers to recover damages from those responsible with ‘lawsuit 
abuse.’”). 
 5. Lifsher, supra note 4 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Letter from Kriss 
Worthington, Councilmember, City of Berkeley, Cal. to the Mayor and City Council (Oct. 12, 
2004) (on file with the City of Berkeley) (“Limits individuals right to sue by allowing private 
enforcement of unfair business competition laws only if that individual was actually injured by, 
and suffered financial/property loss because of, an unfair business practice.”). 
 6. See Bruce A. Colbath, California Supreme Court Further Clarifies Standing 
Requirements of the Unfair Competition Law, 65 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 288, 290 (2011); see 
also Sharon J. Arkin, The Unfair Competition Law after Proposition 64: Changing the Consumer 
Protection Landscape, 32 W. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 158 (2005) (“According to [Stop Youth 
Addiction v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1090–91 (Cal. 1998)], the only reasonable 
construction of the Unfair Competition Law is that its remedies are not available to private parties 
if the Legislature did not include an express private right of action in the enforcement scheme for 
the underlying law.”). 
 7. 718 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 8. See id. at 1104–05, 1107. 
 9. Id. at 1102. 
 10. Id. at 1107. 
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materiality standard in false sales cases.11  
Hinojos expands the California Supreme Court’s holding in 
Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court,12 which concluded that material 
misrepresentations as to origin and composition of consumer goods 
purchased are sufficient injuries to establish standing for false 
advertising claims against retailers.13 Now in Hinojos, with the 
finding that “price advertisements matter,”14 the Ninth Circuit has 
reopened the door to pre–Prop. 64 standards for consumers to 
privately sue retailers who take advantage of consumers through 
dishonest sales techniques. 
This Comment asserts that the Ninth Circuit’s reading of 
California statutes and California Supreme Court precedent balanced 
traditional notions of injury for standing purposes with consumer 
protection policy and, in so doing, advanced consumer rights in 
California.15 Yet, while consumers’ right to sue has been affirmed in 
California, at the federal level and among several other states, 
statutes prohibiting false advertising and unfair competition still 
primarily serve only competitive business interests.16 In most states, 
false advertising and unfair competition statutes define economic 
injury for standing purposes in terms of lost sales or harm to business 
reputation.17 Applying this definition of economic injury means that 
consumers generally lack standing to bring private actions against 
retailers. This nearly exclusive focus on competitors leaves most 
consumers unfairly cut off from the civil justice system.18 
Part II examines the facts of Hinojos and considers the court’s 
reasoning. Part III frames the importance of consumer protection law 
by examining consumer behavior and the public policy principles 
underlying the nationwide prohibition on false advertising. Part IV 
reviews the statutory framework of California’s FAL and UCL—
 
 11. Id. 
 12. 246 P.3d 877 (Cal. 2011).  
 13. Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1106–07.  
 14. Id. 
 15. See infra Part III.A. 
 16. See Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1, 16 (1992) (stating that standing 
under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the federal cause of action for false advertising, is granted 
exclusively to competitors). 
 17. See CAROLYN L. CARTER, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50-STATE 
REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES 3 (2009). 
 18. See infra Part III.B. 
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under which the Ninth Circuit decided Hinojos—as well as the 
political efforts to narrow consumer standing under those laws. Part 
V then analyzes the significance of the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation 
of the standing requirements by comparing them to those under the 
federal false advertising statute19 and other states’ statutes. Part VI 
concludes by predicting the ultimate outcome in Hinojos and its 
impact on future unfair competition and false advertising cases, and 
ultimately suggests that federal law adopt the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  Facts 
On May 6, 2010, Plaintiff Antonio Hinojos purchased hundreds 
of dollars of apparel and luggage at Defendant Kohl’s Corporation’s 
(“Kohl’s”) store in Glendora, California.20 Advertisements and in-
store labeling on several of the purchased items indicated discounts 
of 32 to 50 percent off of their “original” prices.21 When Hinojos 
learned that Kohl’s had heavily inflated the so-called “original” 
prices and that these prices were never representative of the 
prevailing market rates for the goods, he initiated litigation against 
Kohl’s for false advertising and unfair competition in California 
Superior Court.22 Kohl’s removed the case to federal court.23 
Before the district court, Hinojos alleged that Kohl’s deceptive 
sale prices were a material factor in his decision to buy the goods 
from Kohl’s, as opposed to another retailer.24 He also cited 
California statutes prohibiting retailers from representing sale prices 
“as a former price of any advertised thing, unless the alleged former 
price was the prevailing market price . . . within three months . . . 
preceding the publication of the advertisement.”25 Hinojos further 
argued that purchases made under false pretenses—as created by 
 
 19. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). 
 20. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion 
to Dismiss at 3, Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., No. CV 10-07590 ODW (AGRx), 2010 WL 4916647 
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2010), rev’d, 718 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 21. Plaintiff-Appellant’s Opening Brief at 8, Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (No. 11-55793). 
 22. Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1102. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.  
 25. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17501 (West 2013); Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1102–03. 
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Kohl’s advertisements and in-store signage—constituted “lost money 
or property” for the purposes of standing under California’s False 
Advertising Law and Unfair Competition Law.26 The district court 
dismissed Hinojos’s complaint, holding that the alleged material 
misrepresentations were inadequate to establish sufficient economic 
injury to satisfy the standing requirement because Hinojos knew 
Kohl’s offering price and accepted it.27 Hinojos therefore got what he 
paid for.28 The district court also distinguished Hinojos from 
Kwikset, holding that consumer standing did not apply when the 
advertisement pertained to misleading price information, as opposed 
to a product’s substantive qualities.29 Hinojos appealed to the Ninth 
Circuit and successfully argued for reinstatement of his complaint.30 
B.  The Ninth Circuit’s Reasoning 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected the district court’s 
interpretation of Kwikset.31 In Kwikset, the plaintiff, a buyer of 
locksets advertised as “Made in U.S.A.,” sued the seller upon 
learning that the locksets contained foreign parts and were partially 
manufactured in Mexico.32 As in Hinojos, the complaint alleged 
violations of the California Business and Professions Code (“Code”) 
for advertising false information as to the origin and composition of 
the goods in question.33 The trial and lower appellate courts 
interpreted amendments to the Code as a broad limitation on private 
consumer standing, except where the consumer suffered a 
“sufficient” economic injury in the form of “lost money or property 
as a result of the unfair competition.”34 Because the Kwikset buyer 
did not allege that the price he paid for the locksets was excessive or 
that the locksets themselves were defective, the lower courts found 
deception to be the sole injury, and thus insufficient to establish 
standing.35 The California Supreme Court reversed, finding that, 
 
 26. Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1101–02. 
 27. Id. at 1105. 
 28. Id. at 1102. 
 29. Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., No. CV10-07590 ODW (AGRx), 2010 WL 4916647, at *4 
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2010), rev’d, 718 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 30. Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1103, 1108. 
 31. Id. at 1105. 
 32. Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877, 882 (Cal. 2011).  
 33. Id. at 881. 
 34. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 2013). 
 35. Kwikset, 246 P.3d at 881. 
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when deceptive sales techniques have a material effect on the 
consumer’s decision to purchase, the money spent purchasing the 
product in question may be deemed “lost” for the purposes of 
satisfying the standing requirement.36 
The district court in Hinojos narrowly construed the holding in 
Kwikset to misrepresentations of production, composition, and 
origin.37 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, concluding that “Kwikset 
cannot be so easily limited.”38 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that 
consumers care not only about composition and origin of products, 
but also pricing information regarding those products, including their 
“original” price and the extent of an apparent discount or bargain 
during a sale.39 In support of this proposition, the court cited 
academic literature indicating that price statements convey valuable 
“information about the product’s worth . . . and prestige.”40 
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that a consumer who alleges a 
false sale and purported “bargain” as material facts in his decision to 
purchase the product in question has, in fact, been deceived in a 
commercial setting; therefore, the money spent on the purchase 
constitutes an economic injury sufficient to establish standing under 
the FAL and UCL.41 
The Ninth Circuit also disagreed with the district court’s 
conclusion that Hinojos lacked standing because he received the 
benefit of the bargain.42 Under the district court’s view, Hinojos 
lacked standing because he had known the offering price, made a 
decision based on that price, and then kept the goods.43 The Ninth 
Circuit noted, however, that a consumer only receives the benefit of 
the bargain when he has full command of the facts that convince him 
 
 36. Id. at 891–92. 
 37. Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., No. CV 10-07590 ODW (AGRx), 2010 WL 4916647, at *4 
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2010), rev’d, 718 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 38. Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098, 1105 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 39. Id. at 1105–06. 
 40. Id. at 1106 (citing Dhruv Grewal & Larry D. Compeau, Comparative Price Advertising: 
Informative or Deceptive?, 11 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 52, 55 (Spring 1992)). 
 41. The court bolstered its reasoning by citing academic literature that explained the 
psychological effect that perceived deals have on most consumers. Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1106 
(citing Grewal & Compeau, supra note 40, at 56). Such literature helps explain why consumer 
protection laws should be construed to the consumer’s benefit. See infra Part III.A. 
 42. Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1107. 
 43. Id.; Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., No. CV 10-07590 ODW (AGRx), 2010 WL 4916647, at 
*3–4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2010), rev’d, 718 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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to make the purchase.44 Hinojos alleged that Kohl’s 
misrepresentations of deep discounts were material to his decision to 
purchase, as he apparently had lacked the full and complete 
knowledge that would allow him to receive the benefit of the 
bargain.45 The Ninth Circuit therefore found the complaint’s 
allegation of materiality sufficient to satisfy the standing requirement 
at the pleading stage.46 
Drawing strongly on legislative intent and the public policies 
underlying consumer protection law,47 the Ninth Circuit ultimately 
expressed concern that the district court’s narrow interpretation of 
the FAL, UCL, and Kwikset would “bring to an end private 
consumer enforcement of bans” on false sales practices.48 
Delineating Prop. 64’s stated intent of minimizing frivolous lawsuits 
while still protecting the right of private individuals to sue when they 
actually suffer from deceptive commercial practices,49 the court 
firmly stated that “price advertisements matter.”50 For the 
aforementioned reasons, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Hinojos 
had standing to sue Kohl’s for false advertising and unfair 
competition.51 
III.  ANALYSIS  
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the FAL and UCL’s 
standing requirements balanced the concern for protecting consumer 
rights with a faithful interpretation of the legislative intent behind 
Prop. 64 and the plain text of the amendments.52 In applying a 
materiality standard, the court signaled greater receptiveness to 
consumer claims and a judicial commitment to consumer protection 
against deceptive advertising—at least in California.53 Although the 
holding is limited to California, the case may actually bear greater 
significance nationally, especially when one considers the retraction 
 
 44. Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1107.  
 45. See id. 
 46. Id. at 1109. 
 47. See infra Part III.A. 
 48. Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1107 (quoting Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877, 891 
(Cal. 2011)).  
 49. PROP. 64 § 1(d).  
 50. Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1107. 
 51. Id. at 1109. 
 52. See id. at 1104. 
 53. Id. at 1106–07. 
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of consumer standing rights under federal and state laws over the 
past two decades.54 
The analysis begins with an explanation of the public policy 
rationales underpinning consumer protection in order to home in on 
why consumers deserve the right to redress deception in commercial 
transactions (just as business competitors’ have a right to redress 
unfair competition). The analysis then turns to the statutory 
framework of California’s consumer protection law to demonstrate 
the reasonableness of the Ninth Circuit’s statutory interpretation. 
A.  Why Consumer Protection Laws Matter  
and Why Consumers Should Have Standing  
to Enforce Them 
An understanding of why judicial action advancing consumer 
protection is important requires an astute assessment of consumer 
behavior and the effect that patently false or misleading information 
has on consumers. 
1.  Consumer Behavior 
Consumers love a deal. For many, the thrill of finding a good 
deal is comparable to the feeling of accomplishment associated with 
achieving a goal.55 Experiential evidence and empirical data show 
that, when presented with a sale or confronted with strategic price-
framing techniques, consumers are more likely to make a purchase, 
even when the bottom line has the same, or even less, benefit to 
 
 54. See Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and False 
Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1375 (2011) (“Despite the breadth of the language in 
the Lanham Act, which provides a cause of action to ‘any person who believes that he or she is or 
is likely to be damaged’ by a violation of section 43(a), courts have never given those words a 
literal reading. . . . [C]ourts simply excluded consumers from the class the law protected, allowing 
only competitors to sue.”); see also BeVier, supra note 16, at 16 (“The consumer . . . is almost 
never the plaintiff in section 43(a) litigation. The plaintiff, rather, is usually the defendant’s 
competitor.”); HOT COFFEE (HBO 2011) (“Businesses use a number of devices to keep the public 
out of courts.”); Stephanie Mencimer, Consumer Protection’s Citizens United, MOTHER JONES 
(Nov. 9, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2010/11/att-concepcion-chamber 
-of-commerce (noting that in 2005, the Chamber of Commerce “succeeded in winning legislation 
that makes it much harder to bring such cases in state courts”). 
 55. With millions of users and even more daily sales, the proliferation of flash sale websites 
like Gilt and Groupon, which was the second fastest company ever to reach a one billion dollar 
valuation (surpassed only by YouTube), attest to the consumers’ love of “steals and deals.” 
Christopher Steiner, Meet the Fastest Growing Company Ever, FORBES (Aug. 12, 2010, 3:40 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0830/entrepreneurs-groupon-facebook-twitter-next-web 
-phenom.html.  
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consumers.56 A recent example of this occurrence may be observed 
in JC Penney’s attempt to simplify pricing by eliminating sales and 
promotions and instead advertise “everyday low prices.”57 Although 
the price of merchandise remained stable, JC Penney’s sales declined 
by 25 percent less than one year after implementing its sales plan, a 
loss of several billion dollars.58 In 2006, Macy’s attempted a similar 
plan to “retrain” customers away from the psychological game of 
sales and discounts.59 However, for consumers, the “thrill of getting 
a great deal, even if it’s an illusion,” was too great, and both 
companies quickly abandoned their plans to stem the tide of 
dramatically falling sales.60 
Empirical studies show that “[t]he use of ambiguous and 
potentially misleading jargon increases an advertisement’s 
trustworthiness. . . . Such contextual effects can be particularly 
salient when consumers pay less attention to the content validity and 
focus more on the contextual cues.”61 Applying this notion to a false 
sales context, a consumer is more susceptible to believe a misleading 
price statement based on contextual cues, such as higher “original” 
prices or a purportedly high discount rate when that consumer has 
not obtained a complete set of information as to the prevailing 
market price of a good, and accordingly cannot assess the “content 
validity.”62 Given the widespread recognition of consumers’ love of 
deals, manipulating that aspect of human nature—as retailers often 
do—should be considered contrary to public policy. 
Correspondingly, undercutting consumers’ ability to seek legal 
redress for retailers’ deceptive practices implicitly allows such 




 56. Stephanie Clifford & Catherine Rampell, Sometimes, We Want Prices to Fool Us, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2013, at BU1. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. (“Penney recognized that human trait and backtracked on its pricing policy, offering 
coupons and running weekly sales again . . . . But here’s the thing: customers weren’t actually 
paying less.”). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Guang-Xin Xie & David M. Bousch, How Susceptible Are Consumers to Deceptive 
Advertising Claims? A Retrospective Look at the Experimental Research Literature, 11 MKTG. 
REV. 293, 302 (2011). 
 62. Id. 
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2.  Public Policy and the Goals 
 of False Advertising Laws 
Evidence shows that consumers make purchasing decisions 
based on symbols such as brand names and advertisements. 
Accordingly, laws prohibiting the misleading use of symbols and 
trade information recognize the “commercial magnetism” of such 
symbols.63 A broadly accepted economic principle states that “[a] 
perfect market demands perfect enlightenment by those who buy and 
sell.”64 Such enlightenment may be effectively achieved through 
consumer protection. Fundamentally, consumer protection law 
encourages consumers to make choices freely and confidently in the 
marketplace,65 ensuring the market’s continued strength66 for the 
benefit of consumers and competitors alike.67 
Given consumers’ reliance on advertising from sellers,68 
ensuring truth in advertising is of critical importance in fulfilling the 
“perfect enlightenment” precept. Advertisements, however, are 
inherently a mix of persuasion and information, often heavily 
weighted toward persuasion.69 Accordingly, from an “above the 
trees” perspective, unfair competition and false advertising laws 
recognize the effect that commercial deception can have on 
consumers and seek to protect businesses and individuals alike from 
 
 63. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942). 
This case specifically pertains to trademarks, but the sentiment is equally applicable in the false 
advertising context. Arguably, relative price has as much commercial magnetism as brand 
symbols. 
 64. Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade 
Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1168–69 (1948); see also BeVier, supra note 16, at 5 (“Under 
conditions of perfect competition, there is no advertising because consumers are assumed to be 
endowed at the outset with perfect information and thus have no need for it. In the imperfect real 
world though, consumers have imperfect knowledge.”). 
 65. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2 cmt. a (1995). 
 66. Richard F. Dole, Jr., Merchant and Consumer Protection: The Uniform Deceptive Trade 
Practices Act, 76 YALE L.J. 485, 506 (1967); see also Michael R. Baye, Director, Bureau of 
Econ., Fed. Trade Comm’n, Speech at Bentley College: The Economics of Consumer Protection, 
Antitrust, and Policy 23 (Apr. 24, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov 
/speeches/baye/080424bentley.pdf) (“For competition to thrive consumers must receive accurate 
information about products and services.”). 
 67. Baye, supra note 66, at 4, 24. 
 68. See Brown, supra note 64, at 1168. 
 69. Id. at 1169; see also Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of 
Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 67, 115 (2012) (quoting SUSAN STRASSER, SATISFACTION 
GUARANTEED: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN MASS MARKET 27 (1989)) (“Marketing is 
designed not merely to give information about products consumers already know they want but to 
‘make people want many other things’ . . . . In the false advertising context, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) has candidly acknowledged this persuasive function.”).  
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the consequences of such deception.70 More narrowly, a Federal 
Trade Commission survey reflects how vulnerable consumers are in 
terms of likelihood of suffering from deception in commercial 
transactions.71 The survey discloses that more than thirty million 
American adults report being victims of fraud in commercial 
contexts.72 While the survey concerns consumer fraud nationally, 
state legislatures are empowered to address this problem and protect 
consumers from misinformed decision making, and to rectify the 
consequences of consumer fraud. 
The Ninth Circuit also explained the importance of consumer 
protection from false advertising. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit 
remarked that a “deceived bargain hunter [obviously] suffers” when 
his expectations and the realities of economic value are misaligned.73 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s dual stress on the deception and its 
connected injury recognizes precisely why protecting consumers 
from deceptive trade practices is an important role the judiciary 
should play. The Ninth Circuit’s analysis highlights how consumers 
shopping in California are affected by violations of California’s UCL 
and FAL. The analysis further emphasizes why—when their injury is 
so obvious—consumers should be able to seek redress from sellers 
who engage in practices that are dishonest and contrary to public 
values.74 
B.  The Ninth Circuit’s Balanced Reading of  
California’s Unfair Competition and 
 False Advertising Laws 
With the realities of consumer behavior and the policy of 
protecting consumers in mind, the Ninth Circuit set out to interpret 
the statutory standing requirements at issue in Hinojos fairly and 
 
 70. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942) 
(discussing that the impact of symbols on consumers as a basis for prohibitions on false 
advertising and deceptive use of trademarks); see also Brown, supra note 64, at 1167 (stating that 
private disputes on deceptive use of trade symbols “touch[es] the public welfare,” thus 
elucidating the basis prohibiting false advertising). 
 71. FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER FRAUD IN THE U.S.: SECOND FTC SURVEY S-1 
(2007) [hereinafter FTC SURVEY]. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 74. See Tawnya Wojciechowski, Letting Consumers Stand on Their Own: An Argument for 
Congressional Action Regarding Consumer Standing for False Advertising Under Lanham Act 
Section 43(a), 24 SW. U. L. REV. 213, 232 (1994). 
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reasonably.75 After all, these manipulative tactics are illegal in most 
states and the real issue is whether consumers have standing to hold 
liable the businesses that engage in such practices.76  
To determine whether the court correctly decided the standing 
issue, it is necessary to review the statutory framework within which 
Hinojos’s claim existed. First, California’s UCL prohibits all “unfair 
or fraudulent business act[s] or practice[s] and unfair, deceptive, 
untrue or misleading advertising . . . .”77 Specifically in the context 
of false sales, California’s FAL provides that “[n]o price shall be 
advertised as a former price of any advertised thing, unless the 
alleged former price was the prevailing market price . . . within three 
months next immediately preceding the publication of the 
advertisement . . . .”78 
In order to sue for violations of these laws, both the UCL and 
FAL adhere to the standing requirements defined in section 17204.79 
Section 17204 allows just two avenues to satisfy the standing 
requirement.80 Specifically, the complaint must be made by (1) a 
government actor “in the name of the people of the State of 
California upon their own complaint,” or (2) “by a person who has 
suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of 
the unfair competition.”81 Alleged violations of the UCL or FAL 
provide the foundation for redressing unfair competition and false 
advertising in California.82 Each statute was heavily referenced in 
 
 75. Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1105–07. 
 76. See Steven J. Cole, State Enforcement Efforts Directed Against Unfair or Deceptive 
Practices, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 125, 126 (1987) (stating that the consumer protection movement 
flourished in the 1960s, culminating with the enactment of various deceptive trade practices 
statutes by the early 1970s). 
 77. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2013). 
 78. Id. § 17501. 
 79. Id. § 17200; id. § 17501. 
 80. Id. § 17204. 
 81. Id. (emphasis added). 
 82. See Arkin, supra note 6, at 157 (“17200 effectuates its protective public policy purpose 
by broadly defining unfair competition under what are called ‘the five prongs’: (1) Unlawful 
conduct; (2) Unfair conduct; (3) Fraudulent conduct; (4) Deceptive advertising; and (5) 
Violations of 17500. Virtually all Unfair Competition Law actions are primarily predicated on 
one or more of the first three prongs, i.e., that the conduct is unlawful, unfair or fraudulent.” 
(internal citations omitted)); see also Henry N. Butler & Jason S. Johnston, Reforming State 
Consumer Protection Liability: An Economic Approach, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 13 (2010) 
(“These statutes are typically very short, broadly prohibiting conduct that is ‘false or deceptive’ 
and granting private parties very broad standing to sue. Importantly, these statutes often overlap. 
California, for example, has both an Unfair Competition Law modeled after the FTC Act and an 
Unfair Practices Act that tracks the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.”). 
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Kwikset and Hinojos.83  
Section 17204 was last amended in 2004 following the approval 
of Prop. 64 through the California initiative process.84 The campaign 
to enact Prop. 64 and its consequences are discussed in greater detail 
in Part IV, but for now it is important to note that the amendment to 
section 17204 eliminated standing in “the general public” and 
allowed standing only to a “person who has suffered injury in fact 
and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair 
competition.”85 Adding the requirement of “lost money or property” 
negated the traditional presumption of emotional injury caused by 
fraudulent conduct.86 Amending sections 17200 and 17500 in 
accordance with Prop. 64 considerably restricted who had standing to 
sue, thereby limiting consumers’ ability to redress false advertising 
on multiple levels.87 First, as a result of the statutory restrictions 
placed on individuals who fall victim to false advertising, the Prop. 
64 amendments to the UCL and FAL compel consumers to rely 
heavily on public officials to redress deceptive business practices.88 
However, while the law refocused consumer protection efforts 
toward public officials, the amendment included no additional 
resources or powers to assist those officials in addressing consumer 
claims of deception more effectively.89 In fact, “severe budgetary 
cut-backs . . . prevent many actions against false advertisers from 
being investigated” by the federal and state officials.90 The lack of 
government resources to respond to consumer claims, much less to 
 
 83. See generally Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that 
Hinojos did have standing to sue under the UCL and FAL); see generally Kwikset Corp. v. 
Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877 (Cal. 2011) (holding that consumers who allege that they were 
deceived into purchasing a product due to the misrepresentation of a product’s label have “lost 
money or property” as required by California Proposition 64 and have standing to sue under the 
UCL and FAL). 
 84. See infra Part IV.  
 85. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 2013); id. § 17204 (West 2004), amended by 
PROP. 64 § 3 (2004).  
 86. See generally Klass, supra note 4 (discussing the law of deception and how it inherently 
punishes parties for their intentional acts). 
 87. Proposition 64: Limits on Private Enforcement of Unfair Business Competition Laws. 
Initiative Statute., CAL. ONLINE VOTER GUIDE (Feb. 10, 2006), http://www.calvoter.org 
/voter/elections/2004/props/prop64.html (The official Summary of Prop. 64 states that, if enacted, 
the amendments to UCL and FAL “authorize only California Attorney General or local public 
officials to sue on behalf of general public to enforce unfair business competition laws.”). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Wojciechowski, supra note 74, at 232. 
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actually litigate them, underscores the importance of providing 
consumers the ability to seek redress for harms caused by deceptive 
business practices themselves.  
Moreover, when a consumer’s financial injury from a falsely 
stated “sale” price is relatively small, the heightened standing 
requirement places another barrier between the consumer and justice. 
When the cost of litigation is so great, additional burdens tend to 
discourage wronged consumers from suing on their own, causing 
them to either suffer a permanent injury or wait for public officials to 
take an interest in their case.91 
Moreover, section 17204 requires a government actor to bring 
the complaint on his own accord.92 Accordingly, unless a consumer 
can satisfy the requirement of injury in fact and has sufficient 
resources to sue a large retailer like Kohl’s, said consumer must rely 
on government attorneys to obtain a remedy.93 Given chronic 
understaffing and lack of resources, this path toward relief 
substantially limits an individual consumer’s ability to obtain redress 
for false advertising and unfair competition.94 
Another barrier to consumer standing has been judicial 
interpretation of section 17204’s “lost money or property” clause. 
Prior to Kwikset, the prevailing judicial interpretation of the 
aforementioned clause was that loss needed to be in the form of lost 
sales or goodwill.95 This interpretation focused on harm that 
competitors suffered due to false advertising, rather than how 
commercial deception injured consumers financially and 
 
 91. See J. Shahar Dillbary, Trademarks as a Media for False Advertising, 31 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 327, 339 (2009) (explaining that consumer recovery for false advertising under private 
causes of action is unlikely because “consumers rarely have the means and resources to detect 
fraud and recover damages” and the high cost of litigation often deters consumer claims); see also 
Dale A. Reinholtsen, Role of California’s Attorney General and District Attorneys in Protecting 
the Consumer: Substantive Areas of Action, 4 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 35, 37, 54 (1971) (“Harsh 
economic realities create numerous practical barriers which confront the consumer when he seeks 
to bring a private action.”). 
 92. CAL. BUS & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 2013).  
 93. Id. 
 94. See Reinholtsen supra note 91 (contending that the paths to relief provided under the 
UCL “may be somewhat illusory for many consumers [. . .] when the economic realities of the 
marketplace are recognized”); see also Homer Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit 
Reform, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 41 (1969) (discussing the obstacles consumers face in pursuing 
legal action). 
 95. See Hall v. Time Inc., 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 466, 467, 469, 471–72 (Ct. App. 2008); see also 
Peterson v. Cellco P’ship, 80 Cal. Rptr. 3d 316, 321 (Ct. App. 2008) (explaining the requirements 
for standing under section 17204). 
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emotionally.96 Since consumers do not have goodwill or sales to lose, 
this interpretation left the vast majority of consumers who were not 
part of a class action or represented by a government official without 
a path for redress.97 
Another interpretation of section 17204’s injury requirement 
asserted that an injury of lost money or property must “exclude 
situations in which a person receives the benefit of the bargain.”98 
When the “bargain” is considered mere payment of the stated price 
of a good or service, and the “benefit” is retained when the consumer 
chooses to purchase based on said price,99 the bar for a consumer not 
receiving the benefit of the bargain is impracticably high.100 Such a 
narrow interpretation of benefit and bargain essentially meant that a 
consumer received “the benefit of the bargain” so long as the seller 
did not literally lie to him regarding the price that he expected to 
pay—and actually paid—for the product in question. This 
interpretation ignores the empirically proven effect that purported 
“deals” have on consumers’ decision whether to purchase a product, 
as well as the fact that a consumer makes purchasing decisions by 
comparing current prices to original prices, not just by evaluating the 
bottom-line.101 
Moreover, construing “injury” to mean only a tangible financial 
loss that is strictly associated with the purchase in question overlooks 
the likelihood that a deceived consumer has already incurred—or 
would incur—additional transaction costs in the process of rectifying 
 
 96. See Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877, 883 (Cal. 2011). 
 97. See Hall, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 470 (“The voters’ intent in passing Proposition 64 and 
enacting the changes to the standing rules in Business and Professions Code section 17204 was 
unequivocally to narrow the category of persons who could sue business under the UCL.”). See 
generally Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., No. CV10-07590 ODW (AGRx), 2010 WL 4916647 (C.D. 
Cal. Dec. 1, 2010), rev’d, 718 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding that the plaintiff lacked 
standing to sue because he had not lost money or property). 
 98. Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., No. CV10-07590 ODW (AGRx), 2010 WL 4916647, at *2 
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2010), rev’d, 718 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing cases in the Ninth Circuit 
where a consumer lacked standing when he retained merchandise, even if not of the character for 
which the consumer bargained); see also Johnson v. Mitsubishi Digital Elecs. Am. Inc., 365 Fed. 
App’x 830, 832 (9th Cir. 2010) (“If one gets the benefit of the bargain, he has no standing under 
the UCL.”); Koh v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., No. C-09-00927, 2010 WL 94265, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 6, 2010).  
 99. See Hinojos, 2010 WL 4916647, at *3. The district court followed this presumption, 
stating that because Hinojos knew the price he was paying and chose to follow through with the 
sale, he received the benefit of the bargain. 
 100. See id. 
 101. See Clifford & Rampell, supra note 56; supra Part III.A.  
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the deception on his own.102 The possible transaction costs that a 
consumer could incur in attempting to rectify the seller’s deception 
include return trips to a store or potential loss of value between the 
purchase price and the resale value of the product.103 For example, in 
the latter scenario, if the consumer attempts to return the product and 
thereby loses “the benefit of the bargain,” courts may conclude that 
the initial deception was remedied when the consumer returned the 
product.104 Such an interpretation would yet again leave consumers 
as the victims of false advertising without a means of suing for the 
seller’s deception and UCL or FAL violation. 
A final interpretation of the standing requirement for consumers 
under section 17204 assumed that the plaintiff must be entitled to 
restitution.105 However, the Kwikset court observed that this 
interpretation conflated a remedies issue with a procedural issue.106 
The court noted that this interpretation of Prop. 64 is illogical, for it 
prematurely speculates on the merits of a case before deciding 
whether the plaintiff even has standing.107 
The California Supreme Court considered the variety of 
interpretations applied to the “lost money or property” clause of 
section 17204, and ultimately landed on the broadest interpretation of 
standing where consumer protection statutes were involved.108 
Notwithstanding the challenges that Prop. 64 placed on consumers, 
the Kwikset court concluded that allowing standing for private 
consumers who truthfully allege that a product’s deceptive labeling 
 
 102. See Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877, 893 (Cal. 2011); see also Meyer v. 
Sprint Spectrum L.P., 200 P.3d 295, 299 (Cal. 2009) (discussing how the phrase “any damage” in 
the California Civil Code “may encompass harms other than pecuniary damages, such as certain 
types of transaction costs”). 
 103. Cars, for example, lose 10 to 20 percent of their value annually, and even new cars 
depreciate by an average of 11 percent within the first minute they are driven off the dealer’s lot. 
See Depreciation Infographic: How Fast Does My New Car Lose Value?, EDMUND’S (Sept. 24, 
2010), http://www.edmunds.com/car-buying/how-fast-does-my-new-car-lose-value-infographic 
.html. Under the benefit-of-the-bargain interpretation, a consumer attempting to remedy deception 
encountered when purchasing a new car stands to lose thousands of dollars due to diminished 
resale value alone. 
 104. See Hinojos, No. CV10-07590 ODW (AGRx), 2010 WL 4916647, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 
Dec. 1, 2010), rev’d, 718 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 105. Kwikset, 246 P.3d at 894–95.  
 106. Id. at 895. 
 107. See id. at 894–95, for a discussion of Clayworth v. Pfizer Inc., 233 P.3d 1066, 1087–88 
(Cal. 2010), where the California Supreme Court found plaintiff’s inability to demonstrate 
“compensable losses or entitlement to restitution” immaterial to the validity of standing under 
Section 17204. 
 108. See id. at 881. 
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was material to their decision to purchase is consistent with the 
meaning of Prop. 64 and “preserv[es] for actual victims of 
deception . . . the ability to sue and enjoin such practices.”109 This 
determination paved the way for the even more inclusive view of 
standing articulated in Hinojos. 
IV.  CONSUMER STANDING IN A POLITICAL CONTEXT:  
THE CAMPAIGN FOR PROP. 64 
As the Hinojos court observed, most consumers have been 
motivated to make purchases “because [a] proffered discount seemed 
too good to pass up,”110 despite their awareness that retailers “have 
an incentive to lie to their customers” about sale prices.111 This 
shared experience may well be the reason why the issue of standing 
in false advertising and unfair competition cases strikes a chord with 
so many consumers. 
Also, the long-held right to seek redress for these deceptive 
business practices in court was curtailed only recently.112 Until 
November 2004, Hinojos’s ability to sue Kohl’s would only have 
been limited by his ability to write a well-pleaded complaint.113 This 
is because any private consumer had standing under the FAL as a 
member of the general public.114 However, as mentioned above, the 
requirements for standing changed when voters passed Prop. 64.115 
The proponents of Prop. 64 asserted that, by adding a basic 
requirement that individual plaintiffs demonstrate an injury-in-fact, 
the civil justice system and California businesses could avoid 
 
 109. Id.  
 110. Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 2013); see also FTC SURVEY, 
supra note 71 (discussing the various ways consumers are most frequently defrauded). 
 111. Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1101. 
 112. CAL. ONLINE VOTER GUIDE, supra note 87.  
 113. Prior to the passage of Prop. 64, California Business & Professions Code section 17204 
provided that “[a]ctions for relief pursuant to this chapter shall be . . . by a person acting for the 
interests of itself, its members or the general public.” CAL. BUS & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 
2004). Prop. 64 replaced “acting for the interests of itself, its members or the general public” with 
“who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair 
competition,” thus imposing stricter pleading requirements on consumers. See Roxana Mehrfar, 
Redefining Commonality for Consumer Class Actions Under California Business and Professions 
Code Sections 17200 and 17500, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 353, 375 (2010) (“[C]omplaints alleging 
violations of the UCL fraud prong are subject to the ordinary pleading standard—a short and 
plain statement alleging facts upon which relief can be granted.”). 
 114. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 2004) (version prior to amendment due to 
Prop. 64’s approval). 
 115. CAL. ONLINE VOTER GUIDE, supra note 87. 
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frivolous “shakedown lawsuits.”116 Proponents of Prop. 64 sought to 
end these so-called frivolous lawsuits against businesses, which 
“corporate interests . . . long attacked as an invitation for 
unscrupulous attorneys to file . . . against businesses.”117 However, 
the proponents of Prop. 64 failed to also convey to voters that the 
amended law provided no mechanism to weed out frivolous claims 
from legitimate ones.118 Thus, while the amendments preserved 
prohibitions on deceptive pricing and other unfair business tactics, 
they left even the innocent victims (and legitimate claimants) of 
consumer fraud unable to obtain redress for clear violations of the 
FAL and UCL. 
While this consequence of the amendment is clearly misaligned 
with the public policy goals of consumer protection,119 in fact it was 
the proponents’ goal.120 Ironically, the Prop. 64 proponents’ primary 
campaign strategy involved deceiving voters who, like consumers, 
rely on advertising and contextual cues to make decisions. The 
deception in the “Yes on 64” campaign stemmed largely from the 
appearance of support from so-called grassroots organizations called 
“Californians Against Lawsuit Abuse” and “Yes on 64—
Californians to Stop Shakedown Lawsuits.”121 These groups were 
primarily funded by a wide array of business interests, including 
several health insurance and pharmaceutical companies, associations 
of car dealers and manufacturers, “Big Tobacco,” and a home 
mortgage company that is now defunct as a result of its unscrupulous 
 
 116. See Marc Lifsher, Prop. 64 Backers Fight for Attention, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2004, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/nov/01/business/fi-prop641. 
 117. Marc Lifsher & Myron Levin, Citing Prop. 64, Firms Seek to Kill Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 27, 2004, http://articles.latimes.com/2004/dec/27/business/fi-prop6427; see PROP. 64, § 1, 
SUBD. (C) 1(c) [‘Findings and Declarations of Purpose’] (stating that the purpose of narrowing the 
UCL’s standing requirement through the amendment was because of “[f]rivolous unfair 
competition lawsuits [that] clog our courts[,] . . . cost taxpayers[,] . . .. and . . . threaten[] the 
survival of small businesses”).  
 118. See Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877, 894 n.21 (Cal. 2011) (“[N]othing 
suggests the voters contemplated eliminating statutory standing for consumers actually deceived 
by a defendant's representations.”). 
 119. See supra Part III.A. 
 120. DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW 
§ 2.1 (2013); see also Lifsher & Levin, supra note 117 (stating that the authors of Prop. 64 
intended to make “it harder for businesses to be sued over deceptive advertising and other 
fraudulent practices under the law”). 
 121. See Lifsher, supra note 5. See generally Mission and History, CALIFORNIA CITIZENS 
AGAINST LAWSUIT ABUSE (2012), http://www.cala.com/about-cala (explaining the mission of 
CALA as a nonpartisan grassroots organization seeking to reduce lawsuit abuse). 
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business dealings.122 Yet, proponents’ campaign materials suggest 
that their membership is comprised mostly of individuals and small 
businesses.123 The United States Chamber of Commerce, the nation’s 
largest business association, made the third largest donation and 
spent nearly half a million dollars in support of Prop. 64’s passage.124 
The Chamber of Commerce was simultaneously involved in 
comparable state-level efforts to limit individuals’ standing against 
businesses across the country.125 
Opponents of Prop. 64 countered that this amendment to the 
UCL and FAL would dismantle efforts to protect consumers against 
businesses that take advantage of consumers’ information gap.126 
The campaign stressed that the amendment “made it harder for 
businesses to be sued over deceptive advertising and other fraudulent 
practices under the law.”127 Opponents also argued that, while some 
private claims may have been frivolous, the great majority of claims 
arose from consumers feeling wronged by a business’s deception, 
and not consumers playing “jackpot justice” to “shakedown” 
business owners.128 Nonetheless, the opponents’ arguments were 
drowned out by the far better financed campaign in support of Prop. 
64.129 
 
 122. FOLLOW THE MONEY, supra note 2 (featuring a table of the proponents top twenty 
contributors). Countrywide Home Loans donated $200,000 to the “Yes on 64” campaign in 2004, 
when it was the largest mortgage lender in the United States. Id. By 2009, Countrywide had gone 
under and its officers were under investigation for civil and criminal fraud charges. Press Release, 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Former Countrywide CEO Angelo Mozilo to Pay SEC’s Largest-Ever 
Financial Penalty Against Public Company’s Senior Executive (Oct. 15, 2010) (on file with Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n). 
 123. CALIFORNIA CITIZENS AGAINST LAWSUIT ABUSE, supra note 121. 
 124. FOLLOW THE MONEY, supra note 2 (listing a donation by the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce to Yes on 64: Californians to Stop Shakedown Lawsuits for $495,000). 
 125. See HOT COFFEE, supra note 54. 
 126. Richard Holober, An Opposing View: Prop. 64, SFGATE, Oct. 26, 2004, http://www 
.sfgate.com/default/article/AN-OPPOSING-VIEW-PROP-64-Protect-consumers-2678773.php. 
 127. See ARKIN, supra note 6, at 156 (discussing the Prop. 64 campaign’s emphasis on 
frivolous and extortive lawsuits); see also Lifsher & Levin, supra note 117 (stating that “[t]he 
ballot measure made it harder for businesses to be sued over deceptive advertising and other 
fraudulent practices under the law”). 
 128. Id. 
 129. FOLLOW THE MONEY, supra note 2 (stating that the proponents, led by “Yes on 64,” 
raised $20,551,881. The top three contributors made the following campaign contributions to 
“Yes on 64”: California Motor Car Dealers Association—$5,251,072; Alliance of Automobile 
Manufacturers California—$1,500,000; US Chamber of Commerce. The opponents of Prop. 64 
received $3,206,391 in donation—its largest from Consumer Attorneys of California in the 
amount of $763,700.); see also Eric Lipton, Mike McIntire & Don Van Natta, Jr., Top 
Corporations Aid U.S. Chamber of Commerce Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22 2010, at A1. 
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After outspending the opponents of Prop. 64 by more than six to 
one,130 the “Yes on 64” campaign helped Prop. 64 pass with 59 
percent of the vote.131 Until Hinojos, Prop. 64 effectively shut 
courthouse doors to the vast majority of consumers, including those 
who were demonstrably injured by a business’ illegal, deceptive 
practices. 
V.  COMPARING CALIFORNIA’S STANDING  
REQUIREMENTS TO THE FEDERAL STANDARD  
AND OTHER STATES’ 
State false advertising laws are important to consumers because 
the federal prohibition on false advertising, found in the Lanham 
Act,132 only permits standing for business competitors.133 While the 
Lanham Act undoubtedly benefits consumers by imposing some 
degree of accountability on businesses and encouraging honesty in 
the marketplace, the total lack of standing for private individuals 
forces consumers to rely entirely on state law remedies.134 
Through the experience of Prop. 64’s initial interpretation, 
which is echoed at the state level around the country,135 consumers 
are at a serious disadvantage in the fight against false advertising. In 
Alabama, for example, the test for a private individual’s right of 
action under the state’s false advertising statute is a showing that the 
plaintiff “suffered any monetary damage as a result of . . . 
‘unconscionable, false, misleading or deceptive act or practice in the 
conduct of trade . . . .’”136 New York’s deceptive business statute 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. California General Election: State Ballot Measures, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, 
http://vote2004.sos.ca.gov/Returns/prop/00.htm (last updated Dec. 7, 2004). 
 132. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012). 
 133. See Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir. 1971) 
(“Congress’s purpose in enacting § 43(a) was to create a special and limited unfair competition 
remedy, virtually without regard for the interests of consumers generally and almost certainly 
without any consideration of consumer rights of action in particular.”); see In re Agent Orange 
Prod. Liab. Litig., 475 F. Supp. 928, 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); see also Brian Morris, Consumer 
Standing to Sue for False and Misleading Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Trademark Act, 17 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 417, 427 (1987) (describing the Second Circuit’s holding 
in Colligan that consumers lack standing under the Lanham Act). 
 134. BeVier, supra note 16, at 16; see Tushnet, supra note 54, at 1375. 
 135. See generally Carter, supra note 17 (summarizing the discrepancies in the various fifty 
states’ Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices statutes that protect consumers from unfair 
business practices). 
 136. Deceptive Trade Practices Act, ALA. CODE § 8-19-5 (2002); Billions v. White & 
Stafford Furniture Co., 528 So. 2d 878, 880 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988). 
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mirrors California’s, providing that an individual person may bring 
suit for “deceptive practices in the conduct of business” only if that 
person has suffered financial injury as a result of the deception.137 
State statutes such as these, which severely restrict consumers’ 
standing, are not anomalous. Rather, in addition to the examples 
listed above, sixteen other states have statutes that are roughly 
comparable to California’s UCL138 and likewise include California’s 
high bar for establishing consumer standing.139 The status of state 
false advertising and unfair competition statutes thus underscores 
how unique the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of California law was 
in Hinojos. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The broader implication of the Hinojos holding is a rollback on 
a movement by business interests to limit their liability for false 
advertising. The campaign for Prop. 64 and other legal efforts to 
limit the scope of consumer protection laws have significantly 
obstructed consumer access to the civil justice system over the last 
two decades,140 and—as feared by its opponents—Prop. 64 has had a 
“devastating impact on innocent” Californians.141 Yet, the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Hinojos may signal a wind shift in the arena of 
private individual standing for unfair business practices claims. 
Given the materiality standard announced in Kwikset and 
affirmed for false sales in Hinojos, when Hinojos’s case returns to 
district court on remand, Hinojos has a strong chance of obtaining 
relief against Kohl’s. To achieve this result, Hinojos must effectively 
 
 137. Consumer Protection Act, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (McKinney 1984). 
 138. Robert C. Fellmeth, California’s Unfair Competition Act: Conundrums and Confusions, 
Unfair Competition Litigation, 26 CAL. L. REVISION COMM’N REP. 191, 239 (1996). 
 139. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471 (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110b (West 2012); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.204 (West 2013); HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-2 (2013); 121 1/2 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 262 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 51 § 1405 (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 207 
(2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2 (West 2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-103 
(West 2012); NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-1602 (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (2013); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 39-5-20 (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-5-2.5 (LexisNexis 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, 
§ 2453 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.020 (West 2013); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 100.20 
(West 2013). 
 140. See HOT COFFEE, supra note 54; see also CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, supra note 
4 (stating that as a result of CALAs, “statistics reflect juries’ increasingly antagonistic attitude 
toward injured plaintiffs”). 
 141. President William J. Clinton, Remarks on Vetoing Product Liability Legislation and an 
Exchange With Reporters (May 2, 1996) (transcript available via The American Presidency 
Project). 
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convey that his decision to purchase items at Kohl’s was based on a 
belief that Kohl’s apparent price reductions presented a deal too good 
to pass up. 
In sum, despite the fears of California business interests that 
Hinojos opens the floodgates to frivolous lawsuits,142 the decision is, 
in fact, in accord with California voters’ belief that Prop. 64 protects 
businesses from frivolous claims while retaining actual victims’ 
ability to pursue legitimate claims. 
The balance of legislative intent, consumer protection policy, 
and traditional understandings of what constitutes injury, as applied 
in Hinojos, represents a sensible approach to the application of false 
advertising laws that ought to be reflected at the federal level as well. 
Although Hinojos is limited to California, the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach should put the other states in the circuit on notice as to the 
Ninth Circuit’s likely interpretation of the standing requirement in 
connection with other unfair competition laws. Hopefully, the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision is the first of many judicial and legislative actions 
to acknowledge the value of standing for private consumer actions 
when deceptive business practices are in play. 
 
 142. See Press Release, Am. Tort Reform Ass’n, ‘The Next Big Thing’ in Litigation Abuse, 
ATRA Cites Exploitation of State Consumer Protection Acts a Growing Concern (July 13, 2006), 
available at http://www.atra.org/newsroom/next-big-thing-litigation-abuse; see also Lifsher & 
Levin, supra note 117 (discussing Prop. 64’s alleged main purpose of ridding the California legal 
system of “shakedown lawsuits” that allegedly only benefitted unscrupulous lawyers). 
